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INTRODUCTION

Largely a development of the last half-century of government
expansion, many of the health, safety, and welfare protections required
by the federal government now fall upon the states.1 With the states
picking up the load, many state jurisdictions elect to administrate these
duties through agencies. 2 These agencies promulgate numerous
regulations and enforce them too. 3 In making these laws and
regulations, the government may require the public to submit
documents that convey factual information in order to achieve the
overall policy goal.4
These statutes and regulations provide guidance as to what qualifies
as an acceptable submission during these interactions between the
agency and the public. 5 Obtaining the correct document poses no
problems for those individuals already living in a particular jurisdiction.
However, for those individuals moving between states, the submitted
official documents may emanate from another state. Depending on the
language used in the statutes or regulations, a government employee
from another jurisdiction solely on the
may reject the official documents
6
point.
origination
their
basis of
While the Constitution requires the recognition of equivalent records
from another jurisdiction under the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
Congress sets forth the scope and mechanism. 7 Many state agencies are
reticent to deviate from policy and procedure absent an instruction from
a higher authority like the courts. In many of these instances, the
rewards are minimal for a successful legal challenge with a steep cost
along the way; so an aggrieved party usually chooses to comply rather
than try to enforce their constitutional rights against the state
government.
When considering the acknowledgment due a factually-based
official document from the executive branch,8 it appears like a
1. See Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and ConstitutionalDuels: Separation of Powers
and State Implementation of FederallyInspiredRegulatory Programsand Standards,46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2005); see generally Scott M. Matheson, Jr., ConstitutionalStatus
and Role of the State Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1993).
2. Rossi, supra note 1, at 1345.
3. Id. at 1346.
4. See infra notes 178-89.
5. See infra notes 178-89.
6. See infra note 189.
7. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122 (recodified as 28 U.S.C. §
1738 (2006)); Act of Mar. 27, 1804, 2 Stat. 298 (recodified as 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (2006)).
8. Both a permit/license (i.e.; driver's license, vehicle registration, concealed weapons
permit, etc.) and a factual document (i.e.; vital statistics, birth certificate, marriage record,
fingerprints, etc.) can qualify as an executive record. In this Article, I distinguish between the
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straightforward Full Faith and Credit Clause legal analysis. However,
the courts have explored only a minimal amount of this part of the
Constitution during our country's history.9 In reviewing the scholarly
literature in this subject matter, numerous scholars examined the history
of the clause and continue to focus on the judicial proceedings aspects,
while mostly ignoring the growing issue related to the treatment of
official documents containing factual information between the states. 10
This aspect will continue to grow in importance as the state government
executive branches continue to expand their reach upon the citizenry,
and require unnecessary and burdensome compliance that could
otherwise be avoided by honoring the official and factual documents
from another jurisdiction that contain virtually the same information.
Given the gravity and recurring nature of this issue, this Article
looks to determine if and how a state should recognize official executive
documents that contain factual information from another jurisdiction.
Part I of this Article evaluates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution. Because much of the common law draws its roots from
England, this section provides a historical perspective from the Middle
two types of records to only consider those that provide factual data and not those that convey
some sort of privilege.
9. See infra Part I.E.
10. Compare Shawn Gebhardt, Comment: Full Faith and Creditfor Status Records: A
Reconsideration of Gardiner,97 CALIF. L. REV. 1419, 1445 (2009), with David E. Engdahl, The
Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 1584, 1595 (2009); Stephen E. Sachs, Full
Faith and Credit Clause in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1240 (2009); Ralph U.
Whitten, The Original Understandingof the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of
Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 369 (1998) [hereinafter Whitten 4]; Ralph U.
Whitten, The ConstitutionalLimitations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith and Credit, 12
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1981-82) [hereinafter Whitten 3]; Ralph U. Whitten, The
Constitutional Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative
Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (pt. 2), 14 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 735 (1981) [hereinafter Whitten 2]; Ralph U. Whitten, The ConstitutionalLimitationson
State Court Jurisdiction:A Historical-InterpretativeReexamination of the Full Faith and Credit
and Due Process Clauses (pt. 1), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499 (1981) [hereinafter Whitten 1];
Kent H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A HistoricalAnalytical Reappraisal,56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 58 (1957); James D. Sumner, Jr., The Full-Faithand-Credit Clause: Its History and Purpose, 34 OR. L. REV. 224, 242 (1955) [hereinafter
Sumner 1]; James D. Sumner, Jr., Full Faith and Credit For JudicialProceedings, 2 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 441 (1955) [hereinafter Sumner 2]; Robert E. Childs, Full Faith and Credit: The
Lawyer's Clause, 36 Ky. L.J. 30 (1947); G.W.C. Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal
System, 20 MINN. L. REV. 140, 144 (1935); Albert S. Abel, Administrative Determinationsand
Full Faithand Credit,22 IOWA L. REV. 461, 464 (1937); Edward S. Corwin, The Full Faithand
Credit Clause, 20 U. PA. L. REV. 371 (1933); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Congress
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421 (1919); George P. Costigan, Jr.,
History of the Adoption of Section 1 of Article IV of the United States Constitution and a
Considerationof the Effect on Judgments of that Section and of FederalLegislation, 4 COLUM.
L. REV. 470 (1904).
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Ages to the drafting of the Constitution relating to the circumstances of
the past that created the language guiding today's policies. Part I
continues with the congressional implementation statutes followed by
an analysis of the applicable case law to this authority and general legal
principles to draw a precedent and current rule on how a Court would
proceed with such a case.
Part II turns to the actions undertaken by the states where the Full
Faith and Credit Clause would apply with respect to executive
documents. This Part supplies a common scenario with a representative
example of a state where the jurisdiction summarily rejects official
executive documents from elsewhere in favor of exclusively using its
own. An assessment of common law precedent relating to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, the subsequent congressional legislation, and the use
of general common law principles to the representative example
considers the most likely approach by the courts. The analysis then
turns to the possible legal liabilities and fallout for the state and
government workers should an aggrieved plaintiff decide to pursue a
case.
Part III makes policy recommendations based on the constitutional
assessment to the representative example and the possible legal liability
for both the state and government workers. Finally, the discussion
comes full circle to recognize the wide-ranging impacts of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause upon the Executive Branch's expanded role within
the states, along with a need for a firm awareness within each
jurisdiction of its regulatory actions.
I. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

Section 1, Article 4 of the U.S. Constitution states in part: "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State; and the Congress may by
general laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."" While written
more than two centuries ago, the meanings of yesterday and today need
reconciliation prior to any application within a contemporary context.
As such, the history of the clause provides the starting point for this
evaluation.
A. Pre-ColonialHistory in Recognizing ExtrajudicialDocuments
Originating in England's "common law," the first use of the term
"Record" emanates from the practice of giving credence to another
11.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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12
court's decision in the Old Royal Courts of Justice at Westminster.
During this time, the Treasury secured parchment transcripts of the
pleadings and decisions, which lead to the eventual label as the "courts
of record."' 13 The courts recognized these "records" as "authentick
beyond all Manner of Contradiction," which meant they provided
indisputable accounts for the events in each case. 1 4 Accordingly, the
doctrine of res judicata subsequently precluded the re-litigation of an
issue already decided by these courts.
At the same time, other royal tribunals like the Admiralty Court, the
Chancery Court, various church related courts, county courts, courts of
the hundreds, and courts baron did not fall under the category of "courts
of record" and were not required to apply common law. Faced with a
request for recognition of a foreign judgment, the Admiralty Court gave
the first support to decisions of civil law outside of the country as early
as 1536 for those judicial settings considered not-of-record.' 6 Likewise,
the Chancery Court also allowed foreign judgments, but it limited those
17
situations to controversies between parties and not on the Court itself.
However, this approach with respect to admiralty law and its
international consequences became the exception and not the prevailing
practice amongst the courts not-of-record. 18
In contrast, the Westminster tribunals treated decisions from courts
not-of-record and those outside England the same.1' In situations where
a plaintiff prevailed in one of the not-of-record or foreign courts, but
later found the matter in a Westminster tribunal, the issue presented
only received prima facie treatment. 20 This meant the burden of proof
would shift from the plaintiff to the defendant to show inaccuracy,
mistake, or another reason for overturning the case, but it would not
trigger a res judicata situation.21
Hence, the traditional prima facie rule regarding not-of-record and

12.

See Engdahl, supra note 10, at 1595. The Old Royal Courts of Justice at Westminster

included the Court of King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and the court of Exchequer.
Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.at 1596.
16. Id.at 1597. The Admiralty courts handled cases concerning civil law, and many of
the cases presented to them came from civil law as applied by maritime law or under the civil
law of Rome used through much of Europe. Id.
17. Id.at 1598.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1599. Professor Engdahl explained that Lord Hardwicke noted in two separate
occasions (1737 and 1750) of his desire for a change in policy that allowed the "courts of
record" to apply res judicata on cases between England and Ireland as well as Scotland. Id.
20. Id. at 1597.
Whitten 3, supra note 10, at 14.
21. See id.;
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foreign judgments remained the approach until the nineteenth century in
England, but it also provided a foundation for the early American
colonies' legal framework.22
B. ColonialHistory in Recognizing ExtrajudicialDocuments
By the Colonial Period, the meaning of the word "record" came in
line with the modem definition used today. 23 The term now began to
encompass documents coming from all three government branches. The
evidentiary documentation of a legislative action or proceeding received
usage; while judicial decisions, which required the 2production of the
judgment's physical record also maintained support. Moreover, a use
of the word could also mean an executive document when not
contextually referring to the other two branches of the government.
Like sovereign countries, the colonies for the most part, operated
independently.2 This autonomous approach created an environment
whereby each colony did not need to acknowledge the courts, the
records, or acts of the other jurisdictions. 27 With this loophole in place,
many individuals with adverse judgments chose to simply relocate to a
neighboring colony rather than satisfy a court order against them. 28 As
such, the enforcement of court orders in different jurisdictions proved
elusive for the issuing colony.
However, English common law posed two unique impediments to
the fledgling colonies when it came to recognizing documents from
another jurisdiction. 29 One of the main concerns of earlier time periods
centered upon the authentication of official documents. In England,
copies of documents bearing "Seals of Public Credit" received treatment
as authentic and accurate;
otherwise, the Court would require
31
corroboration.
testimonial
22.

See Engdahl, supra note 10, at 1601.

23. Compare AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1034 (2d ed. 1985), with
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 472 (1755), available at
http://www.archive.org/details/dictionaryofenglO2johnuoft (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). The 1755
dictionary defined the word as, "1. To register any thing, so that its memory may not be lost; 2.
To celebrate; to cause to be remembered solemnly; and 3. To recite; to Repeat; perhaps to tune;"

whereas the modem explanation states, "1. To set down for preservation in writing or other
permanent form; 2. To register or indicate; 3. To register (sound) in permanent form by
mechanical or electrical means for reproduction..." Id.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Millsv. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481 (1813).
See generally Whitten 3, supra note 10, at 57.
See Sumner 1, supra note 10, at 227-28.
Id.
See Gebhardt, supra note 10, at 1429.
See Engdahl, supra note 10, at 1602.
See id.; Whitten 3, supra note 10, at 57.
See Engdahl, supra note 10, at 1602. Interestingly, this policy did not extend to
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Moreover, another difficulty arose from the "locality" rule where a
court drew a jury from a location where the facts of a case transpired.32
Because the jury judged the case on their own knowledge, they could
not inquire further into any issue beyond where the event occurred.33
To resolve these issues in the colonies, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Maryland, and South Carolina all passed laws to overcome these
Because each jurisdiction
inherited precedents from England.
identified the issue in its own way, the colonies' enacted their own
resolutions differently. 35 Although, the common thread amongst each
beyond the ordinary
act allowed for the recognition within the colonies
36
judgments such as a court order or decision.
In the circumstances surrounding the treatment of records, the
Maryland and South Carolina acts provided reference to administrative
actions of the executive branch.3 Maryland's law allowed for the
recognition of debts acquired in the other colonies regardless of38whether
action.
it emanated from the courts or through an administrative
Following Maryland's lead and adding more explicit language,
South Carolina offered broad recognition beyond the other colonies and
their judiciary. 39 South Carolina accepted all types of executive papers
including copies of records, deeds, and bonds so long as the document
contained a seal attesting to its veracity from an administrator spanning
from the Lord Mayor of London to a notary.40
foreign seals or private ones since "tis not possible to suppose... to be universally known." Id.
32. See id. at 1604.
33. Id.
34. See Sumner 1, supra note 10, at 227-28.
35. Id. Connecticut made the first move in 1650 to allow authentication, but it required
reciprocity from other colonies and excluded foreign judgments as well as executive or
legislative acts. Id. Maryland followed in 1715 when it passed an act to do the same; although it
included foreign judgment and did not require reciprocity. Id. In 1731, South Carolina joined the
other two colonies in recognizing judgments and documents from outside its jurisdiction. Id.
Finally, Massachusetts passed its act just before the American Revolution with language very
similar to that found in the Articles of Confederation. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Gebhardt, supra note 10, at 1430.
38. Id. The Maryland act stated "that all debts and records, whether by judgment,
recognizance, deed inrolled, and upon record, the exemplification thereof.., shall be sufficient
evidence to prove the same." See Nadelmann, supra note 10, at 39.
39. See Gebhardt, supra note 10, at 1430.
40. Id. The South Carolina act stated:
All exemplifications of records, and all deeds, and bonds, or other specialties,
all letters of attorney, procuration or other powers in writing, and all
testimonials which shall at any time hereafter be produced in any of the courts
of judicature in this province, and shall be attested to have been proved upon
oath under the corporation seal of the Lord Mayor of London, or of any other
major or chief officer of any city, borough, or town corporate ... or under the
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Massachusetts enacted its version in 1774, just prior to the
Declaration of Independence and the American Revolution. 4 ' By
implementing the act, Massachusetts tried to resolve two issues.42 It
tried to provide a path for a party to prove to a Massachusetts Court that
it received a judgment in another colony, and to how much credence it
will receive in the new jurisdiction. 43 While not specifically mentioning
documents from the executive branch of government, it contained the
most similar language used in the corresponding clause 4of
4 the Articles
credit.
and
faith
"full
phrase
the
absent
of Confederation
The Continental Congress tackled the issue of recognizing actions
outside a particular jurisdiction in writing the Articles of
Confederation. 45 Language guiding the recognition of foreign
judgments or of any other official transactions was not included in the
first draft.46 However, as the members decided to conclude their work,
the Congress appointed a committee to evaluate the need for any
additional articles to avoid minor oversights and errors.4 7
On the following day, the committee returned with the following
proposal:
That full Faith and Credit shall be given in each of these States to
the Records, Acts, and Judicial Proceedings of the Courts and
Magistrates of every other State, and that an Action of Debt may
lie in the Court of Law in any State for the Recovery of a Debt
due on Judgment of any Court in any other State; provided the
Judgment Creditor gives sufficient Bond with Sureties before
said Court before whom Action is brought to respond in Damages
to the Adverse Party in case the original Judgment should be

hand of the governor.., or under the notarial seal of any notary public, shall be
deemed and adjudged good and sufficient in law...
See also Nadelmann, supra note 10.
41. See Sumner 1, supra note 10, at 228.
42. See Ross, supra note 10, at 144.
43. Id.
44. See Sumner 1, supra note 10, at 228.
45. Id. at 229. Interestingly, Professor Sumner points out that the members of the
Continental Congress had familiarity with the English practice that only allowed for prima facie
treatment for those courts not-of-record. Id. He also surmises that in drafting the Articles of
Confederation those advocating for a full faith and credit provision deemed the need for a close
relationship between the newly formed states and their residents as paramount. Id.
46. Id.
47. Able, supra note 10, at 464. The committee members included James Duane of New
York, Richard H. Lee of Virginia, and Richard Law of Connecticut. See Childs, supra note 10,
at 39.
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48
afterwards reversed and Set aside.

While not exactly accepted by the entire body, the Congress
ultimately approved the opening language where it finished with "the
Courts and Magistrates of every other State," absent a recorded vote.49
Moreover, the clause became the subject of four cases that related to
recognizing another jurisdiction's judicial decisions. Despite the new
language encompassing a possible request for recognition of
administrative or executive documents from another jurisdiction, all of
the acknowledgment of judgments in other states
the cases related to 51
evidence.
on
focused
Accordingly, this period's history shows that the colonies struggled
to break free from the recognition restrictions inherited from English
common law, that the difficulties in coming to a consensus on a guiding
principle amongst the thirteen jurisdictions that acknowledged the
other's legal policies, and that some of the early language used in the
laws indicated reciprocity to administrative and executive documents
from outside jurisdictions.
C. Framingthe Full Faithand Credit Clause in the Constitution
Given the need for a more unified approach toward governing the
newly formed states, the Constitutional Convention gathered in 1787 to
write a superseding document. In the original Resolutions, James
Madison and his fellow Virginians failed to include a full faith and
credit clause. However, some attendees like Charles Pinckney of South

48. Able, supra note 10, at 464-65. The committee actually returned with seven different
articles for the Continental Congress's consideration, but only this one is relevant to this
evaluation. See Sumner 1, supra note 10, at 229. Of note, this is the first time that the term "full
faith and credit" makes an appearance in the colonies or soon-to-be states. See Ross, supra note
10, at 141. However, one scholar explains that the earliest usage of the term emanates out of a
translation from Latin by Richard Eden of the Bull of Pope Alexander VI from May 4, 1493,
establishing the limits of the New World between Spain and Portugal. Id. The copies of this
translation received treatment as if they were originals both in and out of court so long as
subscribed by a notary. See Nadelmann, supra note 10. Following this lead, the Archbishop of
Canterbury included in his appointment orders "that full faith be given, as well in as out of
judgment, to the instrument by him [the notary] to be made." Id. As a result, the notarial acts of
England received the same treatment as public acts regard to their full faith treatment. Id.
49. See Nadelmann, supra note 10; Ross, supra note 10, at 142. Essentially, the final
version stated, "Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts,
and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State." See id.; Sumner 1,
supranote 10, at 229.
50. See Engdahl, supra note 10, at 1614-19. Pennsylvania had two of the cases, and there
was one each in South Carolina and Connecticut. See id
51. See Childs, supra note 10.
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Carolina offered their own plan that included such a provision.52 While
commentators vary in their accounts on the amount of discussion the
full faith and credit clause invoked during the Congress, 53 it appears that
some consideration went into determining how to handle the mutual
respect issue on official acts of the different states. 54 This responsibility
fell upon the Committee of Detail55to write specifics for "a Constitution
conformably to the Proceedings."
On August 6, 1787, the Committee of Detail released a new
provision that said, "Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of
the Legislatures, and to the records and judicial proceedings of the
Courts and magistrates of every other state." 56 This new language
expanded upon the recognition given in the Articles of Confederation to
include the statutes of the sister states as well as the judgments from the
courts and magistrates.57
With the Detail Committee continuing to refine the language, it
replaced "full faith" with the longer "full faith and credit" phrase on
September 1.58 To eliminate uncertainty with regard to the status of
state statutes, the Committee replaced the language with "full faith shall
be given in each State to the acts of the Legislatures, and to the records
and judicial proceedings of the Courts and Magistrates of every other
State., 59 This new language created opposition from Dr. Hugh
the state's statutes
Williamson of North Carolina because he believed
60
should also receive inclusion in the provision.
As a result of Dr. Williamson's opposition, a new debate erupted as
to whether the new document should address the issue of providing for
sister-state recognition. 61 Virginia's Governor, Edmund Randolph,
52. See Engdahl, supra note 10, at 1619. In fact, James Madison previously declared that
the faith and credit clauses in the Articles of Confederation to be "extremely indeterminate"
after seeing how the courts treated it in the Connecticut and South Carolina cases. Id. at 1618.
53. Compare id. at 1619-28; Able, supra note 10, at 469-71, with Sumner 1, supra note
10, at 230; see Gebhardt, supra note 10, at 1431.
54. See Sumner 1, supra note 10, at 230.
55. See Engdahl, supra note 10, at 1620.
56. See id.; Able, supra note 10, at467.
57. See Able, supra note 10, at 467.
58. See Engdahl, supra note 10, at 1620. Professor Engdahl points out that this change
probably did not cause a problem because it alluded to the well-known prima facie evidence
rule. Id.
59. Id. at 1621.
60. Id. Professor Engdahl explains that the viewpoint of the time separated the functions
of making policy and interpreting the law. Id. The government created statutes and standards to
control behavior in its jurisdiction, while the courts applied preexisting law to specific disputes
by distinct parties to a given set of facts. Id. The notion of giving another state the power to
dictate the law in the host jurisdiction would offend the belief in self-determination both
internally and externally. Id. at 1622.
61. Id.
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proposed a rule that the exceeded the prima facie policy to require
statutes within limits of the
acceptance of another jurisdiction's
62
authority of the enacting state.
Responding to Governor Randolph, Pennsylvania's Gouvemeur
Morris then put forward a more straightforward and palatable approach.
He suggested changing the language to read that "full faith ought to be
given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of every other State and the Legislature shall by general laws determine
63
the Proof and effect of such acts, records, and proceedings.'
Effectively, Gouverneur Morris made the national legislature in charge
of explaining "the ...effect
64 of such acts, records, and proceedings," as
well as the level of proof.
Over the next several days, a special committee received the
proposals from the Detail Committee, Governor Randolph, and
Gouverneur Morris. 65 In the special committee, the members considered
the various arguments previously discussed and tried different
variations with the wording to strike a delicate balance in the power
struggle between self-governance, allowing sister-state recognitions,
and the role of the new national legislature. 6 The Committee ultimately
settled on the following language: "XVI. Full faith and credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of every other State, and the Legislature may by general laws prescribe
the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved
and the effect thereof., 67 It was then sent to the Committee on Style
68
where it only changed the word "Legislature" to "Congress."
Ultimately, the clause received acceptance into the larger document that
became the Constitution without further discussion with the careful
placement inside the section discussing the rights and obligations of the
states toward its citizens, in relation to each other, and with respect to

62. Id. at 1623.
63. See Nadelmann, supranote 10, at 58.
64. See Able, supra note 10, at 469.
65. See Engdahl, supra note 10, at 1624.
66. Id.at 164-28. During this special committee, the members took the position that the
legislature should specify the method of proof for sister-state recognition of judgments only and
not "public acts," Id.However, at the next opportunity, the discussion turned to the usurpation
of self-determination within a state by another through what would become Congress and
whether the language would allow a return to the prima facie evidence approach for
extrajudicial judgments like those cases decided under the Articles of Confederation. Id.To
assuage some member's concerns, James Madison then shifted the language from mandating
Congress to engage in determining recognition policies in forum states to a more permissive
allowance if deemed necessary and proper based on the nation's needs. Id.
67. See Able, supra note 10, at 470 n.28.
68. Id.
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69
the federal government.
In examining this language, Congress received numerous powers
from the freshly written Constitution. First, it bestowed upon Congress
the power to make laws pertaining to the state court requirements for
recognizing acts, records, and judicial proceedings from other
70
jurisdictions, which included the ability to prescribe rules of evidence.
Second, Congress received the power to dictate the level of authority a
piece of evidence shall receive in a .judicial court once proven pursuant
to the rules Congress sets forth. Finally, the Constitution now
expanded the types of documents that another jurisdiction will
acknowledge to include ones emanating from all three branches of the
government including those records originating out of executive
agencies, and not just the judiciary.72
Thus, the Constitution completely changed the manner in which the
courts recognized documents originating outside its jurisdiction and
expanded the source to include the legislative and executive branches
by conveying the power to Congress to set such policies across the
country.

D. CongressionalLegislation Implementing the Full Faithand
Credit Clause
Congress quickly began to legislate with its newly found authority
pursuant the Full Faith and Credit clause when it passed The Act of
May 26, 1790, which is still in effect today.73 Prior to approval, the
69. U.S. CONST.art. IV, § 1.
70. See Childs, supra note 10, at 45-46.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122 (recodified as 28 U.S.C. § 1738). The official title
read as "An Act To prescribe the mode in which the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings in each State, shall be authenticated so as to take effect in every other State." Id. In
pertinent, The Act of 1790 stated,
That the acts of the Legislatures of the several States shall be authenticated by
having the seal of their respective States affixed thereto; that the records and
judicial proceedings of the courts of any State shall be proved or admitted in
any other court within the United States by attestation of the clerk, and the seal
of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the judge,
chief justice, or presiding magistrate, as the case may be, that the attestation is
in due form. And the said records and judicial proceedings shall have such faith
and credit given to them in every court of the United States, as they have by
law or usage in the courts of the State from whence the said records are, or
shall be taken.
Id. Of note, one commentator points out sarcastically that the name is a misnomer; because final
passage actually occurred on May 5, 1790. See Abel, supra note 10, at 472 n.33.
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House of Representatives appointed a committee to draft legislation
74
pursuant to the powers enumerated in the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The committee drafted and amended the bill before attaching a special
provision to compensate a doctor for services. 75 The bill passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, apparently without
76 concerns
that prevailed while drafting the clause for the Constitution.
Consequently, The Act of 1790 ushered in a new era because
Congress decided to take affirmative steps to legislate and dictate policy
to the judicial branch on both the federal and state level. Congress
supplied the forum courts with the proper mechanism for recognizing a
sister-state's acts, records, and judicial proceedings as evidence.77
Furthermore, Congress explained that the meaning of "faith and credit"
should be one where the documents admitted into the courts of a forum
state shall receive the same treatment as in the sister-state.78
Following the Act of 1790, Congress further refined the proof and
effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause when it passed the Act of
March 27, 1804.79 This legislation began with the appointment of a
committee to determine "whether any additional provisions were
necessary to be made to the Act of 1790.,,8o Again extensive discussions
showed a range of opinions, and the House of Representatives decided
to refer the legislation to a select committee of nine members.8 ' Similar
of 1804 passed in similar
to the preceding legislation in 1790, the Act
2
fashion with slight to negligible concerns.8
74. See Whitten 3, supra note 10, at 40.
75. See Abel, supra note 10, at 472 n.35. Interestingly, Professor Nadelmann notes that
the National Archives cannot find the text of the bill when he requested it because they believe
it did not survive the British's burning of the capital in 1814. See Nadelmann, supra note 10, at
60 n. 124.
76. See Abel, supra note 10, at 472.
77. See Gebhardt, supra note 10, at 1437.
78. Id.
79. Act of March 27, 1804, 2 Stat. 298 (recodified as 28 U.S.C. § 1739). In pertinent, The
Act of 1804 stated,
Be it enacted

. . .

that

. . .

all records and exemplifications of office books,

which are or may be kept in any public office of any state, not appertaining to a
court, shall be proved or admitted in any other court or office in any other state,
by the attestation of the keeper. . . And the said records and exemplifications,
authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in
every court and office within the United States, as they have by law or usage in
the courts or offices of the state from whence the same are, or shall be taken.
Id.
80. See Nadelmann, supranote 10, at 61.
81. Id.
82. See Abel, supra note 10, at 474. The commentator surmises that the reason for
Congress's lack of attention to such an important issue stems out of its preoccupation with
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In this new legislation, Congress further clarified some of the
technicalities associated with the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The Act
required forum states to recognize documents from sister-states, such as
records and copies of office books kept in any public office of the three
branches of government. 83 Moreover, Congress extended the
jurisdictional coverage to include the public acts, records, office books,
judicial proceedings, courts, and offices of the Territories of the United
84
States and countries subject to the authority of the U.S. Government.
Subsequently, and without making any further modifications, the
acts of 1790 and 1804 were coupled together and codified into sections
905 and 906 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.85 For the next
144 years, Congress basically left any further interpretations to the
courts and chose not to further utilize the
86 expansive authority it received
from the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
In 1948, Congress revised the federal Judicial Code and made two
modifications to its prior legislation. 87 The first change relocated the old
sections into section 1738 of title 28 of the U.S. Code.88 The second
adjustment was a reconstruction of the statutory language in the Act of
1804.89 Congress changed the phrase "And the said records and
90
exemplifications" to "Such Acts, records, and judicial proceedings."
The only official explanation for this adjustment comes from a Revisers
Note that mentions an effort to 91the language of the statutes with the
wording used in the Constitution.
Hence, Congress took advantage of the authority to set scope and
policy for the absolute recognition of documents from all branches of
government in another jurisdiction and made certain that nonjudicial as
well as court records acquired reciprocal treatment between states. This
legislation has remained relatively unchanged for more than 200 years.
E.PrecedentialAuthority
Constitutional case law provides further guidance on the proper
application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. This part of the inquiry
organizing the Louisiana purchase the country had just acquired from France. Id.
83. See Nadelmann, supra note 10, at 61; Childs, supra note 10, at 45-50.
84. Nadelmann, supra note 10, at 61-62.
85. See Sumner 1, supra note 10, at 236.
86. Id.
87. See Whitten 4, supra note 10, at 369.
88. See Sumner 1, supra note 10, at 236.
89. Id.
90. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
91. See Whitten 4, supra note 10, at 369. Professor Whitten goes on to opine that the
Revisers did not comprehend the original meaning of the words in the Constitution and that their
changes failed to recognize Supreme Court interpretations and precedent. Id.

2012]
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delves into cases pertaining to the recognition of fact-based executive
records emanating from the different authorities. In tracing the different
authorities for the factually based executive branch records, some courts
tend to rely on precedent rooted in either the Act of 1790 or the Act of
1804; but some cases utilize long-founded general legal principles as a
basis for making a decision. Curiously, none of the opinions providing
precedential authority used the clause as a sole basis for requiring the
acknowledgment of factually based executive branch records.
Moreover, the vast majority of opinions involve the civil side of the
law, but the legal precedent also contains some applications in the
criminal context as well.
1. The Act of 1790 (28 U.S.C. § 1738)
Shortly after Congress passed the Act of 1790, confusion on how to
interpret the clause settled into place. 92 The authentication of documents
from other jurisdiction created a dilemma for some courts that looked
toward the preexisting law for guidance. An early case in North
Carolina focused upon a certified copy of a deed for the sale of a slave.
Where the Court clung to its traditional approach by failing to recognize
documents from another jurisdiction, explaining "that act is only
affirmative, and does not abolish such modes of authentication as were
used here before it passed, and this was the usual mode before that
act." 93 In other words, the court kept intact the common law precedent
that required the precise authentication of the record despite the
certification by a government official.
Similarly, the Supreme Court also evaluated a copy of a bill of sale
for slaves in 1835 that occurred in New Orleans. 94 In Owings v. Hull, a
notary made a copy of the bill of sale and recorded it as required under
the laws of Louisiana, which did not allow for its subsequent removal.
The Court explained that
The record is authenticated in the precise manner required by the
act of congress, of the 26th May 1790, having the attestation of
the clerk, and the seal of the Court annexed, together with a
92. See Sachs, supra note 10, at 1240. This commentator explained that three common
approaches emerged from the decisions of the time. Id. Many courts acknowledged the Act of
1790 and the Constitution in upholding judgments from outside its jurisdiction; while some
evaluated the proper treatment for sister-state judgments in new cases by judgment creditors. Id.
However, due to the focus of this Article on the acknowledgment of records from another
jurisdiction, only the third approach by the courts that evaluated documents from another state
becomes relevant.
93. Ellmore v. Mills, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 359, 359 (N.C. Super. L. & Eq. 1796).
94. Owings v. Hull, 34 U.S. 607 (1835).
95. Id.at 610.
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certificate of the96sole judge of the Court that the attestation is in
due form of law.
Accordingly, a lower court in another jurisdiction must accept the
factual document and deem it the same as the original pursuant to the
Act of 1790. 97
In another decision interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause
regarding judgments for precedent, the Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia considered an interracial marriage case where the
ceremony occurred in the District of Columbia but the parties decided to
live in the State of Virginia. 98 In this situation, the court specifically
recognized the constitutional issue and precedent but chose to
distinguish its case on two points. First, the court did not consider the
marriage document as an executive record within the meaning of the
Constitution because a clergyman or magistrate issued it. 99 This opinion
explained that "the clause in question could only go to the extent of
the fact of the marriage and of its legality in the
rendering indisputable
100
place of contract."
Secondly, the circuit court found no precedential authority to allow
individuals the ability to select which public policy applies within a
given jurisdiction. The court explained "[i]t has never pretended that the
laws of a state can, by the acts of individuals, be subordinated within its
own jurisdiction to the laws established by another state."' 1 The court
continued that the marriage document only added further proof that the
party's actions violated Virginia's statutes. 10 2 Predictably, the court
chose to distinguish this case from the applicable precedent regarding
executive documents containing factual information.
Considering these three cases as precedent under the authority of the
Act of 1790, the two earlier interpretations of the legislation validated
the requirement to give sister-state effect to factual executive branch
documents when properly authenticated. However, the one case that
distinguished itself from the precedent made a strong point when it
observed that nongovernmental entities issued the marriage licenses of
the time, which have disallowed application of the legislation. The
second point echoed the debates from the drafting of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and seemed to advocate for states' rights over a strong
national policy, which appears contrary to interpretations discussed in
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 627.
Id.
Exparte Kinney, 14 F. Cas. 602,603 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) (No. 7,825).
Id. at 607.
Id.

101. Id.

102. Id. at 608.
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the Act of 1804.
Thus, the few decisions interpreting the Act of 1790 appear to
provide authority to the recognition of sister-state factual documents
issued by the executive branch of the government.
2. The Act of 1804 (28 U.S.C. § 1739)
In 1890, the Supreme Court made its first decision where the Act of
1804 received mention with regard to factual documents issued from the
executive branch of government.10 3 The contested document was a copy
of a land warrant from the Land Office of the United States in
Washington. 10 4 In this case, the Court stopped short of interpreting the
Act of 1804 when it determined that section 891 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States provided ample authority. 10 5 As such, the Act of
1804 may have provided valid authority as to the policies associated
with factual executive records, but the Court chose to remain silent on
the legislation rather than give guidance and set precedent.
In the same year, the Supreme Court chose to validate in whole an
earlier opinion from the Court of Claims in 1887 with regard to
decisions made executively or administratively by a state
government. 10 6 The lower court held that under the Act of 1804 an
authenticated record should receive "faith and credit" amongst the
states.'0 7 The lower court further explained that the limit for "faith and
credit" afforded a document did not in itself formulate an award or
judgment; and if it prompted a decision at the state level, it could not
apply to the federal government. 10 8 Nevertheless, this explanation and
subsequent validation by the Supreme Court provided further support
for the requirement and recognition of the executive branch documents
between states.
The Supreme Court of Alabama cited the Act of 1804 as authority
103. Culver v. Uthe, 133 U.S. 655 (1890).
104. Id.at 656.
105. Id. at 658. According to the court, the statute directly on point states,
Copies of any records, books or papers, in the General Land Office,
authenticated by the seal and certified by the Commissioner thereof, or, when
his office is vacant, by the principal clerk, shall be evidence equally with the
originals thereof. And literal exemplifications of such records shall be held,
when so introduced in evidence, to be of the same validity as if the names of
the officers signing and countersigning the same had been fully inserted in such
record.
Id. (quoting Rev. Stat. § 891).
106. Williams v. United States, 137 U.S. 113 (1890).
107. Williams v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 116 (1887).
108.

Id.
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when it evaluated the due recognition of a Louisiana marriage
certificate. 10 9 This court explained that under the federal statute, the
certification by Louisiana's Secretary of State provided sufficient
documentation and did not require an additional endorsement by a
presiding justice for validity. 10 Moreover, the Alabama Secretary of
State had already approved the authentication laws of Louisiana with
respect to this subject, so the Court validated the proper authority under
both the federal and state legislation to recognize the sister-state factual
document. "'1
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Maine added a new wrinkle to the
existing interpretations of the Act of 1804 when it decided a case
involving a marriage record from New Hampshire. 112 This court began
by observing that the laws of Maine provided for the recognition of
judicial records originating in other states and federal jurisdictions, but
failed to take any action outside that realm.' 3 The court then turned to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and the Act of 1804
to identify that the federal law that directly addressed the issue.1 14 In its
evaluation, the court pointed out the federal requirements for proper
authentication of factual executive branch documents under the Act of
1804 to receive sister-state acknowledgment as appropriate, but it also
recognized that the legislation did not preclude the use of common law
methods for gaining the same acknowledgment.' 15 As a result, the
Supreme Court of Maine validated the requirement that factual
executive branch documents issued by a sister-state must receive
recognition within its state, but the court created the option of using the
federal or common law methods for gaining the appropriate certification
of the record.
Turning to a criminal law application, the Missouri Supreme Court
considered a case where the government sought validation for the use of
prison records from several other states against a defendant.116 in
evaluating the proper method for authenticating another state's factual
document, the court stated, "[t]he Federal statute is not exclusive of
legislation by the State and a state statute providing for a mode
of authenticating such documents, which does not exclude documents
authenticated as provided by the Federal act, is valid and may be
109. See generally Reid v. State, 168 Ala. 118 (Ala. 1910). This case was later used as
precedential authority to recognize a Tennessee marriage document in the Alabama Court of
Appeals for a case involving bigamy. See Witt v. State, 5 Ala. App. 137 (Ala. Ct. App. 1912).
110. Id. at 121.
111. Id.
112. Reed v. Stevens, 120 Me. 290 (Me. 1921).
113. Id. 291-92.
114. Id.
115.

Id.

116. State v. Hendrix, 331 Mo. 658 (Mo. 1932).
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followed."' "17 Nonetheless, the court further explained that should a
party rely on and fail Missouri's method of authentication without
meeting the issuing state or federal standards, then the document does
not meet the statutory requirements for evidence in a criminal trial." 8
Accordingly, the Missouri court placed a boundary that limited
recognition within its jurisdiction for factual documents to those that
could either meet the authentication requirements of the federal statute
119
or those documents adhering to the issuing or receiving state's laws.
Furthermore, the Washington Supreme Court evaluated the use of
fingerprints certified by wardens of penitentiaries in other states to
identify a defendant under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution and the Act of 1804. 12 In its analysis of precedent, the
court looked at the federal statutes, Oregon and California state statutes,
the precedent set in Alabama's Reid case along with Missouri's Reed
decision, and its own previous decisions for recognizing intrastate
executive branch factual documents. 12 1 In summing up its assessment,
the court concluded that the "great weight of authority" approved the
comparison of a criminal's fingerprint records from another state with a
certified copy of a defendant's while reiterating its position that "the
courts must take judicial notice of them and that such documents are
receivable
in evidence without extrinsic proof of their correctness or
122
verity."'

Likewise, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals evaluated the
recognition due a Louisiana birth certificate used to identify the correct
age of a criminal defendant.' 23 The defendant claimed a birth year that
made him a minor, but the Louisiana records demonstrated he had
attained the age of majority.' 24 In allowing the birth record from
Louisiana to have legal effect, the Texas Court derived its authority
from the Act of 1804 while citing precedent from the Johnson case in
Washington and the previously discussed authority out of Alabama. 125
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
California confronted an entitlement question regarding the true age of

117. Id. at663.
118. See generally id.
119. Id. Interestingly, the Missouri Supreme court cited a case discussed infra where it
declared under general law principles that to gain sister-state effect, the factual executive branch
document must originate from a government organization or institution. Id.at 664 (citing State
v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300 (Mo. 1887)).
120. State v. Johnson, 194 Wash. 438 (Wash. 1938).
121. Id.at442-47.
122. Id. at 447 (quoting State v. Bolen, 142 Wash. 653 (1927)).
123. Northern v. State, 216 S.W. 192, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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an individual trying to qualify for social security benefits. 26 The
authenticity of a delayed birth certificate by order of a State Court of
Record became a central question in the case.' 27 Upon recognizing the
application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the court applied the
same precedent as the previously discussed Williams, but did not
directly reference it. Accordingly, the constitutional provision did not
apply federally. 128 However, the Act of 1804 did apply to the federal
government with heavy emphasis on the language stating the treatment
must occur "no more and no less" than the courts of another state. 129 In
this circumstance, the court turned to the State of Texas's approach
the common law rule of
where the civil and criminal statutes codified 30
evidence.'
facie
prima
as
document
the
treating
Finally, the Supreme Court of Iowa determined a case where the
state's Department of Public Safety suspended a chauffer's license
based on a notice it received from Colorado's Motor Vehicle
Division. 3 1 The central issue before the court with regard to Colorado's
notice focused on whether the state properly authenticated it upon
132
the applicability
of both the Act of 1790 and
In recognizing
dispatch.
that:
the court explained
1804 together,
As to a matter of this nature it is not necessary that the technical
provisions of said two United States Code sections be strictly
followed. Any legal appearing form of certification from another
state to Iowa or any other state which, in fact, gives the
information to Iowa as to appellant's suspension in Colorado is
sufficient. 133
Accordingly, the Iowa Supreme Court appears to maintain a lower
standard for authentication of factual documents issued by executive
branch in other states than the other jurisdictions.
126. Tindle v. Celebrezzee, 210 F. Supp. 912, 913 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
127. Id. at 915; see infra text accompanying notes 135-37.
128. Tindle, 210 F. Supp. at 914-15; see supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
129. Tindle, 210 F. Supp. at 914-15; see supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
130. Tindle, 210 F. Supp. at 914-15; see supra text accompanying notes 107-08. The court
explained that "[b]ut even under the constitutional provision the rights to be accorded are
coincidental with the right accorded by the State whose judgment it is sought to enforce." Id.
131. Shaw v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 131 N.W.2d 261, 262-63 (Iowa 1964). This Article
differentiates between factual based executive documents and permit or privilege based ones.
While on the surface level, the suspension of the chauffer's driver's license in Shaw would be
excluded, the main issue in these cases focuses on the factual report issued by the State of
Colorado. This report fits within the context of a factual based executive document this Article
seeks to examine.
132. Id. at263.
133. Id.
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Keeping authority under the Act of 1804 in mind, the factual
executive branch documents appear to receive equivalent treatment
between the states so long as proper authentication occurs. Some states
will require stricter conformance to the authentication requirements than
others, while the federal government may turn to the applicable state
law for its guidance. In these situations, some states accept the
documents under the prima facie evidence rule while others- give it
immediate legal effect. This recognition applies under both the civil and
criminal contexts.
Hence, the vast weight of legal precedent concerning the Act of 1804
demonstrates that each state must accept executive branch factual
documents from another jurisdiction as long as it meets the minimal
authentication requirements.
3. Common Law Principles
When considering the precedent based on the general principles of
law, the subject matter of the different cases tend to fall into four
different classifications. The first group of cases involve real property
documents where the conveyances or the official government surveys
need clarification on the proper treatment by the courts. This line of
precedent sets forth the standard for the second category where the
courts evaluated a policy for naturalization documents. In the third
group, several different cases illustrate the proper treatment for a litany
of factual records from the executive branch of the government; while
the last category demonstrates the use of factual documents within the
context of criminal law.
a. Real Property Documents
In the first category and continuing the same direction with respect
to the authentication requirements for factual documents as articulated
in common law, the Supreme Court sustained the inherited approach for
records that originated in another state or under the jurisdiction of a
previous country. In 1833, the Court entertained the Perchemancase to
determine the proper evidentiary treatment for a certified copy by the
government of a Spanish land grant from the Florida Territory despite
the nonproduction of the original. 134 Without considering the
implementation acts nor the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court
stated, "on general principles of law, a copy given by a public officer
whose duty it is to keep the original, ought to be received in

134. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 84 (1833).
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evidence."' 35 A later court explained that this decision seemed to allow
for validation based on the actions of Congress, such as the treaty with
Spain to cede the Florida Territory to the United States, rather
1 36 than
Clause.'
Credit
and
Faith
Full
the
to
pursuant
legislation
the
using
However, in 1838 the Supreme Court heard another case out of
Florida regarding a copy of an original land grant from the proper
representatives of the King of Spain.l37 In the Delespine case, the point
of contest focused on the fact that the document in question emanated
from a copy of the original. 138 Somehow, the destruction of the original
document occurred and only the second copy remained in existencealthough, the official records indicated its presence at an earlier date.13
Interestingly, the Court allowed the second-generation copy as valid
proof of the land grant; but it failed to 14explain any basis in the law,
0
statutes, or Constitution for this decision.
Subsequently, a third case involving a Florida land grant by the
Spanish government also received the attention of the Supreme Court
and indirectly articulated the rule for admitting the document in the
Delespine decision made two years earlier. 14 1 Prior to reviewing the
previous decisions of Owings and Percheman followed by an
explanation for distinguishing Delespine, the Court in Wiggins
expressed the rule for copies as:
It follows, in this case, as in all others where the originals are
confined to a public office, and copies are introduced, that the
copy is (first) competent evidence by authority of the certificate
of the proper officer: and (second) that it proves, prima facie, the
original to have been of file in the office, when the copy was
made. And for this plain reason: the officer's certificate has
135. Id. at 85.
136. United States v. Wiggins, 39 U.S. 334, 346 (1840).
137. United States v. Delespine, 37 U.S. 654, 655 (1838).
138. Id. Because of the treaty between the United States and Spain in 1819 to cede Florida,
Congress established a land commission to ascertain land claims. Id. The secretary of the
commission certified the translated documents from Spanish to English and kept the official
records along with the public archives of East Florida. Id.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., id. In the later opinion of United States v. Wiggins with related facts, the
Court gave a subtle inference to the logic behind the decision in this case after directly
distinguishing the two cases and stating, "We have established that the copy of the petition and
decree are made prima facie evidence by the certificate of the secretary." Wiggins, 39 U.S. at
347.

141. Wiggins, 39 U.S. at 347. In this case, the landowner requested and received a grant of
real property from the Governor of Florida while under Spanish rule. Id. Following the treaty
that ceded Florida to the United States, the landowner requested a determination of the real
property rights following the change in governmental rule because the land commission set up
by Congress lost this original document too. Id.
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accorded to it the sanctity of a deposition: he certifies, "that the
original, which exists
preceding copy is faithfully drawn from the
1 42
in the secretary's office, under my charge.
As a result, the Court continued to affirm the common law practice
of authenticating valid documents from jurisdictions outside its own as
prima facie evidence only.
Following the trio of decisions regarding the grants of land, the
Supreme Court decided 3 more cases in 1842 and 1843 that required the
determination of the amount of deference to accord the land surveys
done by the federal government in the wake of the Florida Treaty. 143 All
3 cases focused on the plats and certificates produced by the U.S.
Surveyor General to establish a claim for land, and each case cited to
the Wiggins case as precedent. 44 The courts in Breward and Acosta
reiterated the position that when an official government document
contains an authorized signature, the courts must treat it as prima facie
evidence but shall not give it legal effect.145 Moreover and expanding
on the Breward and Acosta stance, the Hanson opinion clarified that
"[p]lats and certificates, because of the official character of the
surveyor-general, have accorded to them the force and character of a
deposition .... ,,146 Consequently, the Court reinforced the prima facie
evidence rule for executive branch documents while providing a
limitation on its ability to determine an outcome for a given issue within
a case.
In 1927, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve a border dispute
between New Mexico and Texas. 147 Central to the dispute of the
border's location was the actual positioning of the Rio Grande in 1850.
To support their respective positions, the two states offered conflicting
official government documents containing various surveys, patents,
maps, and engineering notes done as part of the Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo with different attestations from various government officials

142. Id. at 346.
143. See generally United States v. Breward, 41 U.S. 143 (1842); see also United States v.
Hanson, 41 U.S. 196 (1842); United States v. Acosta, 42 U.S. 24 (1843).
144. See generally Breward, 41 U.S. at 143; see also Hanson, 41 U.S. at 196; Acosta, 42
U.S. at 24.
145. See Breward, 41 U.S. at 147; Acosta, 42 U.S. at 26.
146. Hanson, 41 U.S. at 200, 201. In this case, the Court chose to order a new survey after
receiving proof from a privately funded evaluation that the Surveyor-General did not follow the
calls of the grant and that the former Governor of East Florida had taken such actions when
provided with these types of discrepancies. Id. at 198, 202.
147. New Mexico v. Texas, 275 U.S. 279 (1927). In this case, the channel of the Rio
Grande as it existed in 1850 provided the agreed upon boundary. The central disagreement
occurred on the correct location of the river at that time.
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including a Mexican Boundary Commissioner. 148 In resolving one of
the contentious points regarding a factual document from Mexico, the
Court turned to the precedent set with Wiggins and Acosta to permit the
admission of records authenticated by the Mexican Boundary
Commissioner
so long as he maintained proper custody of the
49
original. 1
b. Naturalization Documents
Looking at the precedent set with the real property records, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals faced a similar issue with respect to the
use of a copy of an individual's naturalization document when the
government could not find the original.' 50 Citing the Supreme Court's
decisions in Wiggins, Hanson, and Acosta, the court repeated its policy
of affording such executive factual documents under the prima facie
approach while treating it as it would a deposition.15 1 The court
explained "[i]t is not conclusive; but when no especial incentive for
falsification appears, and the records are shown to have been carelessly
kept, it should prevail over the152bare fact that seven years later an
original record cannot be found."'
Citing the Brelin opinion as precedent, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals also decided a similar case regarding a naturalization document
in 1945.153 In this case, the court stated, "[c]ertificates issued
subsequent to the Act of 1906 constitute prima facie evidence of
54
citizenship, and no certified copy of the court record is required."'
This decision reaffirmed the judicial opinion that factual documents
originating out of the executive branch do not need additional
certifications from a court of competent jurisdiction and that they
provide the truth until discredited by other evidence.
c. Other Government Documents
Amongst the earliest decisions at a state court level with respect to
factually based executive documents, the Supreme Court of Maine
decided a mail theft case in Merriam v. Mitchell in 1836.' One of the
issues presented to the court focused on how to treat records from the
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.at 296-97.
United States v. Brelin, 166 F. 104 (8th Cir. 1908).
Id.at 105-06.
Id.

153. See Brassert v. Biddle, 148 F.2d 134, 135 (2d Cir. 1945).
154. Id. at 135.

155. See Merriam v. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439, 439 (1836).
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U.S. Post Office before the state. 156 In evaluating the issue, the court did
not cite any precedent but explained that the records originated out of a
legally required directive "by a sworn officer of the government."1 57 In
such situations, the opinion clarified that documents are admissible to
show the post office's transactions, while the court will consider the
records truthful until proven otherwise. 58
Following this decision, the Supreme Court of Maine heard another
case concerning the use of factual records from the executive branch of
the federal government.' 59 This time the documents came from the
collector of internal revenue and recorded the payments of special
licenses on alcohol for the federal government.' 60 While not a case of
first impression, the opinion cited Merriam and numerous other cases
where various courts allowed factual executive documents that
originated within the state to receive prima facie treatment. 16 1 Based on
the precedent, the Supreme Court of Maine continued the policy of
allowing these types of records with proper authentication.
In 1878, the Supreme Court turned to evaluating the admission of
weather records kept by the U.S. Signal Service in Chicago as part of its
required duties in an unrelated torts case. 162 While the appeal focused
on whether the lower court properly allowed the evidence despite the
absence of a law authorizing these records for evidentiary purposes and
as to its competency, the case provides another example of the treatment
afforded an executive branch factual document.' 63 The Court turned to
the rules of evidence in evaluating the records and explained that the
document did not emanate out of a private entry but from a duty to
record the observed facts.' 64 As such, this case inadvertently supports
the approach that executive branch documents receive treatment as
prima facie evidence only while supporting the previous requirement
that the records lack legal effect.
Shortly after, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated how to
treat records kept by the U.S. Treasury. 165 In its reasoning, the court
156. Id. at 456-57.
157. Id.at 456.
158. Id. at 456-57.
159. See State v. Gorham, 65 Me. 270, 271 (1876).
160. Id. at 271-72.
161. Id. at 272. While many of these cases cited by the court could provide precedent for
this evaluation of the law, the underlying facts do not present a situation where the factual
executive document crosses between states or with the federal government to trigger the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution or the legislative actions. Accordingly, these do not
provide precedential authority for the purposes of this Article.
162. Evanston v. Gunn, 99 U.S. 660, 665-66 (1878).
163. Id. at665.
164. Id. at 666.
165. See Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United States, 240 F. 903, 904 (3d Cir.
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turned to two of the times' most widely published' treatises and
explained that:
We understand the general rule to be that when a public officer is
required, either by statute or by the nature of his duty, to keep
records of transactions occurring in the course of his public
service, the records thus made, either by the officer himself or
under his supervision, are ordinarily admissible, although the
entries have not been testified to by the person who actually
made them, and although he has therefore not been offered for
cross-examination. As such records are usually made by persons
having no motive to suppress or distort the truth or to
manufacture evidence, and, moreover, are made in the discharge
of a public duty, and almost always under the sanction of an
official oath, they form a well-established exception to the rule
excluding hearsay, and, while
not conclusive, are prima facie
66
facts.1
relevant
of
evidence
Accordingly, the Third Circuit approved the recognition of the
treasury records as appropriate in this case.
d. Criminal Law Documents
Turning to the precedential authority emanating out of the criminal
law context, the Missouri Supreme Court decided a case where the
defendant claimed a mental illness and wished to use certified copies of
his medical records at hospitals for the mentally ill in Illinois. 167- While
considering the requirements for recognition of the factual documents
under Illinois and Missouri statutes, the court acknowledged that the
government owned neither hospital. 168 Accordingly, the court decided
that it was proper to disallow the evidence, because the letter from the
hospital's superintendent failed to qualify as neither a record from a
federal government official nor as part of a sister-state factual

1917).
166. Id. at 907. This court cited the footnotes from two different treatises as cases
containing ample precedent: Ruling Case Law and the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure.(Id.)
In reviewing the footnoted cases from The Ruling Case Law treatise of 1915 and the Cyclopedia
of Law and Procedureof 1905, many of the cases cited as precedent concern factual documents
from an entirely intrastate scenario that would lend nothing to this inquiry that seeks to
determine the appropriate treatment across jurisdictions either federal-state or state-state, See
generally Evanston, 99 U.S. at 660; White v. United States, 164 U.S. 100, 101 (1896); Bank v.
Brown, 53 L.R.A. 523.
167. State v. Pagels, 4 S.W. 931, 933-34 (Mo. 1887).
168. Id.
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document. 1
Forty years later, a 1929 criminal case in Oregon expanded the
precedent for factual records based on the use of general legal principles
in 1929.170 The Supreme Court of Oregon reviewed a case where the
defendant received a life sentence based on the state's repeat offender
law and had to decide on whether the use of his prison photograph at
trial was proper.1 71 This court recognized that the photo's authentication
in a trial proved difficult, but it determined that "[t]he only purpose of
the photograph was to aid in identifying the defendant as the man who
had previously been in prison." 172 Consequently, the Supreme Court of
Oregon validated the use of the factual documents from Washington in
order to qualify the defendant as a habitual offender and sentenced him
accordingly.
Refining this approach with respect to fingerprints from the prison
systems in Oregon, Washington, and Colorado, Justice Cardozo wrote
the opinion for a N.Y. Court of Appeals in a case determining the
identityof the defendant and whether he committed crimes in the other
states. Without acknowledging the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the
to the line
congressional legislation as authority, Justice Cardozo turned
174
of cases decided on general principles of law to explain:
No doubt a foreign custodian, annexing fingerprints to his
certificate, would be competent to certify without the aid of any
statute that they were prints or copies of prints kept upon his files
in conformity with law, and to state, after comparison with the
warrant of commitment, the name of the prisoner whose prints
were so recorded. There would be a presumption in such
circumstances that the prisoner fingerprinted was the prisoner
committed; ...The rule of confrontation which in this state is
purely statutory has never been deemed to require the exclusion
of certificates or records made by a public officer in the course of
his official duty .... Upon proof that a person bearing the same
name had been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction, a
certificate, so framed, would be admissible in evidence, if
properly authenticated. . . . The certificate being received,
169. Id.
170. State v. Smith, 128 Or. 515, 524 (Or. 1929).
171. Id at 525-26.
172. Id. at 526.
173. People v. Reese, 258 N.Y. 89, 94-95 (1932).
174. Id. at 94-99. In the opinion, Justice Cardozo cites numerous cases and treatises as
precedential authority for the proper treatment of factual documents. Id.Many of these cases do
not apply in this analysis because they apply to wholly intrastate documents. He does cite the
previously discussed cases of Percheman,Evanston, and Chesapeake & DelawareCanal Co. Id.
at 95, 98.
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comparison of the prints annexed with the prints of the defendant
on file in this State could
then be made in open court by a witness
5
qualified to testify.17
Despite the understanding that properly authenticated factual
documents from another state required acceptance, the court decided
that the state legislature exclusively authorized the custodian of
fingerprint records from New York to certify prior convictions from his
own records and did not provide for such credentials from another
jurisdiction. 76 Consequently, Justice Cardozo's opinion sidestepped the
issue regarding the recognition of factual documents from another state
by finding enough authority within the N.Y. Statutes to protect a
criminal defendant's rights from a possible injustice over a prosecutor's
need to gain a conviction.
As such, the approach that uses the general principles of law as
precedent appears to validate the requirement that one state must accept
the executive branch's factual documents from another jurisdiction in
both civil and criminal contexts provided that a stronger piece of
legislation with a more compelling public policy does not preempt the
action. This acceptance comes with the notion that the facts contained in
the document provide a truthful record until proven erroneous and that it
does not need additional judicial certifications above those required in
the issuing jurisdiction. These documents cover a broad range of scope
in their type and description while providing a factual record of an
event(s).
Therefore, the general legal principles developed by the courts
during the history of our country also provide strong authority that
properly certified executive branch factual documents shall gain
acceptance within a receiving state as reliable and accurate.
In reconciling the foregoing, precedent strongly indicates under all
three lines of authority derived from the Constitution's Full Faith and
Credit Clause, that a state must accept an official factual document from
another jurisdiction's executive branch of government.
II. ACTIONS BY THE STATES
In states with larger regulatory infrastructures, the ability to draft
rules that do not comply with either the Full Faith and Credit Clause or
the implementing statutes frequently create more bureaucratic barriers
to avoid conformance due to the increased complexity of the issues.
When the issues involve less sophisticated or common types of
175. Id. at 95-96.
176. Id. at 95-97.
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of the
transactions, the states appear to readily meet the requirements 177
incident.
without
Constitution
the
of
Clause
Credit
Full Faith and
When complex issues involve multiple agencies trying to protect the
public, the result may cause agencies to forget their responsibility to
honor documents with factual information from other states in carrying
out their duties. These multipronged approaches create situations where
one agency promulgates the rules while another handles the
enforcement. This leaves a gap in authority as to which agency takes the
lead when a problem arises because the two entities may look to the
other in order to avoid a resolution.
With this premise in mind, I will present a representational
regulatory scenario followed by both an analysis of the applicability of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution and an evaluation of
the legal liability to such cases.
A. A Likely Regulatory Scenario
States are presented with many factually based executive documents
from other jurisdictions on a daily basis. Documents such as birth
certificates, vital statistics, marriage licenses, and criminal records
commonly cross state lines. One increasingly pertinent issue is the
movement of families with children from one state to another. For those
children old enough to attend school, each state creates minimal
requirements for admission. One of the requirements that must
accompany a child's application includes an immunization statement.
These statements may include a detailed account of the child's
vaccination record or may provide an acceptable reason for not
obtaining them. Regardless of the status, one administrative agency will
most likely determine the required vaccinations while another will
handle the regulatory and compliance aspects.
In a state with large population migrations like Florida, the
legislature charges the Department of Health (DH) with the
responsibility of maintaining the state's public health system.17 8 The
all people in
system must "promote, protect, and improve the health of' 79
the state through the specific mission stated in the statute."
177.
marriage
jail.
178.
179.

An example of this type of situation occurs with government issued birth certificates,
licenses, and with the use of fingerprints and photos of individuals who spent time in
FLASTAT. § 381.001 (2011).
Id. The statute lays out the mission as follows:

The mission of the state's public health system is to foster the conditions in
which people can be healthy, by assessing state and community health needs
and priorities through data collection, epidemiologic studies, and community
participation; by developing comprehensive public health policies and
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In carrying out this mission, the Florida Statutes specifically require
DH to determine the appropriate health requirements for school children
80
and the authority to adopt rules and enforce the health requirements.
As part of setting the health standards, the DH, in consultation with the
Department of Education, received "the authority to adopt rules and
enforce" the health requirements. 18 1 Pursuant to this statute, the DH
"shall adopt rules governing the immunization of children against, the
' 82
testing for, and the control of preventable communicable diseases.'
Under this mandate, the DH promulgated regulations that require each
student to present immunization records or the appropriate exemptions
solely on its forms.183 Nonetheless, the DH carries out its legislative
mandate to set standards and protect the public.
While the DH sets the regulations, the Florida Legislature splits the
responsibility in enforcing the licensing and compliance regulations
between the Department of Children and Families (DCF) for preschools
without a kindergarten' 84 and the Department of Education for public
and private schools.' 85 Similar to other agencies, DCF enforces the
regulations through regular inspections of the schools pursuant to its
statutory authority and may take disciplinary actions. 6 When those
inspections turn up discrepancies, the agency classifies the violation
based on a progressive enforcement policy 87 For those situations where
a violation occurs due to "Health Immunization Records," the
regulation provides for "Technical Support" to the school on the first
instance up to the
issuance of a complaint with fines of $50 per day for
88
each violation.'
objectives aimed at improving the health status of people in the state; and by
ensuring essential health care and an environment which enhances the health of
the individual and the community.
FLA. STAT. § 1003.22 (2011) (amended Apr. 27, 2012).
180. FLA. STAT. § 1003.22(3) (2011).
181. Id.

182. Id. The statutes also provide for exemptions based on religious reasons, a valid
medical reason by a Florida licensed physician, the DH determines the vaccinations
unnecessary, or an authorized official issues a temporary release. Id. § 1003.22(5).
183. FLA. ADMIN. CODE 64D-3.046 (2011).
184. FLA STAT. ch. 402.3025(2) (2011) (citing FLA STAT. ch. 402.301-402.319 (2011)).

185. Id. ch. 402.3025(1)(a).
186. Id. chs. 402.310, 402.311.
187. FLA. ADMIN. CODE 65C-22.010 (2011).
188. Id. 65C-22.010(2)(e)4. The regulation reads as follows:

4. Children's Health/Immunization Records Disciplinary Sanctions.
a. For the first violation of a Class III Children's Health and/or Immunization
standard, technical assistance shall be provided. The violation will be classified
as "Technical Support."
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For those children moving between states, the documents presented
may originate from their former state. If one fails to make a trip to a
healthcare professional in their new jurisdiction to unnecessarily obtain
new documents, DCF will reject those records as nonconforming to its
standards solely because it comes from another jurisdiction.' 89 As such,
an innocent child and a school can get caught in between a finger
pointing exercise between administrative agencies while the
government as a whole completely disregards the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution.
B. Applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
In considering the applicability to the representational scenario
outlined using the State of Florida's immunization requirements for
children, the influence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution coupled with the congressional legislation and common
law precedential authority provides a point of conflict. As this Article
earlier illustrated, the courts do not give clear guidance on the exact
source of the precedential authority. Therefore, this examination will
look at all three possibilities: the Act of 1790, the Act of 1804, and
common law general legal principles.
b. For the second violation of the same Class III Children's Health and/or
Immunization standard, the department shall issue a formal warning letter
stating the department's intent to take administrative action if further violations
of the standard are found. The violation will be classified as "Technical
Support."
c. For the third violation of the same Class III Children's Health and/or
Immunization standard, the department shall issue an administrative complaint
imposing a fine in the amount of $25 for each violation. This Class III violation
and subsequent Class III violations of the same standard within a two year
period will be classified as "Class Ill."
d. For the fourth violation of the same Class III Children's Health and/or
Immunization standard, the department shall issue an administrative complaint
imposing a fine in the amount of $30 for each violation.
e. For the fifth violation of the same Class III Children's Health and/or
Immunization standard, the department shall issue an administrative complaint
imposing a fine in the amount of $40 per day for each violation.
f. For the sixth and subsequent violation of the same Class III Children's Health
and/or Immunization standard, the department shall issue an administrative
complaint placing the provider's license or registration on probation status for a
period not to exceed six months, and the department shall also issue an
administrative complaint imposing an additional fine of $50 per day for each
violation.
Id.
189. Supplemental Inspection Sheet regarding Child records/infractions from Miatta
Jalaber, Department of Children & Families (Oct. 11, 2011) (on file with author).
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1. The Act of 1790 (28 U.S.C. § 1738)
Under the Act of 1790, Congress essentially directed the forum
courts with an approach for accepting a document with factual
information originating from the executive branch of another
jurisdiction.' 90 Following the precedential authority based in this
legislation, a properly authenticated document with factual information
originating from the executive branch of the government shall receive
reciprocal treatment by another state. 191 This authentication can occur
through traditional methods prescribed in common law or under the
direction of the congressional legislation, which requires a seal from an
issuing state's court that an attestation on the document by 192a
government official complies with the jurisdiction's laws.
Consequently, the authority under the Act of 1790 would require a court
in a receiving state to give the same legal effect in its jurisdiction as
provided by the laws from where it was issued.' 93
In relation to the scenario presented, this means that Florida's DCF
must initially refuse a properly authenticated immunization document
with factual information from another state for a child looking to attend
school as nonconforming solely based on the grounds that only a DH
form satisfies the regulation. However, should the proper representative
of the child decide to challenge this rejection by DCF, a court in the
State of Florida would need to consider the sister-state document and
determine the legal effect within its jurisdiction. So long as the child
maintains the proper immunizations for attending school in the state that
issued the document, the court in Florida would need to follow the
precedential authority explaining the Act of 1790 and strike down the
legislation and accompanying regulations that solely require the DH
forms.
Hence, the Act of 1790 provides authority with respect to a
document with factual information originating from the executive
branch of another jurisdiction to require reciprocal treatment as long as
the dispute finds its way into the court system.
2. The Act of 1804 (28 U.S.C. § 1739)
Alternatively, the Act of 1804 may serve as the underlying source
that applies toward the representative example from Florida. This
legislation requires each state's executive branch of government to
accept properly authenticated, factually based documents originating
190.
191.
192.
193.

28 U.S.C. § 1739 (2012) (originally enacted as Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122).
See supra Part I.E.1.
See supra Part I.E.1.
See supra Part I.E.1.
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from other jurisdictions, expanding the responsibilities associated with
the Full Faith and Credit Clause beyond just the courts. 194 Under the
precedential authority providing guidance for this legislation, one state
must provide equivalent treatment toward factually based executive
branch documents from other jurisdictions. 195 However, the receiving
state may require different levels of authentication based on its own
court precedent, but at the very least, it needs some type of certification
by someone authorized within the issuing governmental unit. 196 In those
situations where the original document remains on file with the issuing
office and the copy contains an official state seal or some other form of
authentication, the receiving state government must accept it in lieu of
their own despite legislation to the contrary.
Moreover, the level of credence to give these sister-state documents
also varies from that of prima facie evidence to full legal effect
depending on the state.197 In a prima facie situation, the state
government would accept the executive document as truthful until
proven otherwise. 198 The burden of proof for denying the document
would shift to the state government receiving the document to show it
as inaccurate,
a mistaken, or another valid reason for not accepting it as
99
correct.'
In the case of official immunization records, many states create and
maintain a proprietary database for these records. A state official
maintains these records and allows for the issuance of properly
authenticated copies when necessary just like they do for birth
certificates, driving histories, and prison records. Should a child's
representative present this document from another state to a school in
Florida, the prima facie approach will require acceptance as selfproving in lieu of the DH form stated in the regulations as the only
satisfactory evidence of immunizations for a student. The Florida
administrative agency deciding to reject the document will bear the
burden of proving that it fits into one of the acceptable categories for
denial on accuracy grounds prior to issuing a determination of
noncompliance. With the prima facie approach requiring the acceptance
of official immunization records from another state, the Florida
regulations requiring solely a DH form to satisfy the immunization
requirements for school age children fails to allow for the acceptance of
official documents from another jurisdiction.
Therefore, the precedent and authority conveyed in the Act of 1804
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

28 U.S.C. § 1739 (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 1804, 2 Stat. 298).
See supra Part I.E.2.
Supra Part I.E.2.
Supra Part I.E.2.
Supra Part I.E.2.
Supra Part I.E.2.
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requires an administrative agency to accept factually based official
documents from other jurisdictions in lieu of its own unless it can prove
a proper reason for denial.
3. General Legal Principles
Finally, the common law general legal principles also provide a
source of precedent and authority with respect to factually based
executive branch documents. The precedent for this approach requires
the courts from each state to accept factual documents from executive
branches outside its jurisdiction so long as a different piece of
legislation with a stronger public policy argument does not preempt
it. 0 While not needing additional judicial certifications for acceptance,
a state government receiving an official record from another jurisdiction
the document provided as a truthful
must treat the facts contained2 in
1
record until proven otherwise. 0
Applying the Florida example to the common law legal principles
precedent will result in a blend of the previous analysis concerning the
Act of 1790 and the Act of 1804. Following the Act of 1790, the
application of the general legal principles articulated in common law
required the Florida government to reject immunization records validly
authenticated and originating from another jurisdiction for a child trying
to attend school on the basis that the forms came from another state and
for this dispute to face a legal challenge in court. Once validated by a
judicial decision as contrary to precedential authority and an
impermissible action, the state of Florida would be required to change
its statutes and regulations in order to comply with the court order or
suspend its enforcement of the applicable laws.
Likewise, the treatment of factually-based executive branch
documents under general legal principles mirrors that of the prima facie
approach used with the Act of 1804. Should a court action occur under
the Florida policy, the governmental unit rejecting the immunization
record for a student from another state solely due to the differences in
forms would bear the responsibility of proving that the document fits
into one of the acceptable categories for denial. Given that many of the
state immunization records for children occur in government
administrated databases, the State of Florida would face a difficult task
absent some sort of fraud.
Furthermore, the State of Florida could try to fit its approach into the
limited precedent based on a different piece of legislation rooted in its
own public policy. The State of Florida would argue that the
200. See Part I.E.3.
201. Supra Part I.E.2.
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requirement to submit the DH form ensures the health, safety, and
Cardozo
welfare of the children in the schools. Consequently, the
2 2
0
opinion discussed earlier helps provide persuasive authority.
However, this argument quickly weakens when considering other
facts in conjunction with the potential public policy defense from the
State of Florida. First, the DH permits children into schools that object
to immunizations for religious reasons. This means that some children
enter schools without attaining the DH standard. Therefore, students
with immunization records from another state pose less of a threat to
their classmates because they maintain at least some type of vaccination
history."
Furthermore, while courts allow each state to set its own public
policies irrespective of another jurisdiction, the courts must also
recognize that it operates within the construct of a broader national
system that may require accommodation.2 °3 Many of the immunization
standards originate from the federal government from agencies like the
National Institutes of Health or national organizations such as the
American Academy of Pediatrics. The standards from another state
most likely follows one of these two organizations, so the child's
vaccination history will adhere to some type of national policy. As such,
the State of Florida would have a difficult time showing a court that a
child with vaccinations from another state poses a greater threat to a
school's population than one without, especially if the other jurisdiction
follows some type of national guideline.
Finally, the Cardozo opinion must be distinguished when applied to
the Florida example because the difference between denying a child
access to school on the basis of his immunization records and ensuring a
criminal defendant receives proper treatment in the courts does not
embody similar characteristics outside the factually based, executive
branch documents. The consequences of using fingerprints to sentence a
criminal defendant as a habitual offender provides a far more serious
scenario, invoking some of the highest standards of legal analysis,
because it contemplates an individual's life or liberty. In contrast, the
denial of a child's access to schools based on the refusal to accept
another state's immunization record does not nearly rise to that level of
scrutiny, because the student already received vaccinations based on
some type of standard elsewhere. Accordingly, a court hearing a case
202. See supra text accompanying notes 173-76.
203. See e.g., Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939);
Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935). These cases apply to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause in the context of sister-state judicial decisions, which offers very limited
precedent in this analysis, however they can provide a limited example on how one state
maintains the right to set its own public policies within its jurisdiction but must keep inside the
limits of a national system.
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evaluating the rejection of sister-state immunization records in Florida
would probably distinguish the exception to the general principles
precedent put forward by Justice Cardozo.
Thus, a Florida court facing the issue of rejected immunization
forms due to noncompliance with the DH form requirement will most
likely disallow the applicable statutes and regulations should it base its
opinion on the common law's general legal principles.
Therefore, all three authorities conclusively indicate that factual and
official executive records from another jurisdiction require treatment on
par with the accepting state's own documents. Consequently, the DH
regulations and the associated disciplinary provisions in the example
above, will not pass a constitutional evaluation, making the laws void
and unenforceable.
C. The Legal Liability to a State and its Employees
On the surface level, this type of constitutional violation by a state
creates a very unique but common scenario. Should the aggrieved party
choose to wage a legal battle, the injury manifests deep implications.
First, the student immediately suffers from the state's decision to violate
his constitutional rights. Second, the student is deprived of an
educational opportunity while the case makes its way through the legal
system unless he relocates back to his original state. Both pose an
unnecessary and undue burden on the student, so compliance usually
becomes the path of least resistance. As such, in this instance, the
traditional lawsuit provides an inadequate mechanism to properly
protect a student's constitutional rights in this instance from improper
state regulations and compliance measures due to the unequal
positioning of the parties.
Conversely, the government and its employees perceive a minimal
risk by keeping the status quo and forcing submission by the aggrieved
party. A legal loss by the government means that the regulation gets
rewritten to allow for constitutional compliance with minimal financial
consequences to the individual case. The employees of the agency see
no immediate repercussions from their illegal actions that injure others
because they forget that their obligations operate differently than their
private sector counterparts. Thus no perceived internal deterrence exists
to prevent these types of abuses because the cloak of regulations
appears to provide protections.
To remedy this situation, a class action lawsuit offers a better avenue
to force a state government into compliance; because the individual
damages individually do not justify such an action while the combined
injuries provide significant incentives. Under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a named representative can commence a
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lawsuit if they meet all of the requirements. The rule provides for two
parts. The first part enunciates four separate prerequisites that must
occur,2 0 4 followed by a second component that allows for compliance
with one of three different conditions. 20 5 With these criteria met, "the
by order whether to
court must--at an early practicable 2time--determine
06
certify the action as a class action.,
Continuing with the Florida example, a class representative will
show that numerous children who arrive from another state start school
each year and have similar claims. As a result, the joinder of each
child's representative becomes impracticable, so a class action will
204. FED. R. OF CIV. P. 23(a). The rule states:

One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1)the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id.
205. Id.23(b). The rule reads:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
Id.
206. Id. 23(c)(1)(A).
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provide efficiency for the courts.
Further, most of these children bring with them their official
immunization records from another jurisdiction. However, pursuant to
the Florida regulations, unless they submit the DH immunization form,
the school will have to deny them access or suffer discipline. This
means that the questions of law or fact surrounding the requirement to
provide only a Florida form as an admission prerequisite becomes
common to all members of the class.
Finally, the named party will need to demonstrate its ability to
ensure fair and adequate representation and that it received typical
treatment. 207 While this will depend on the named party in the lawsuit,
the refusal of out of state official immunization records occurs
universally due to the Florida Regulations. The class representative's
ability will remain case specific but highly likely. Consequently, a
representative plaintiff could receive class certification on a lawsuit on
behalf of all those injured parties where the state compelled compliance
to its requirement to only accept its own documents and to refuse those
official ones from another jurisdiction.
Beyond the civil liabilities, the bureaucratic employees and their
general counsel offices could also face criminal action due to the special
obligations placed on government workers. Like many other states, the
Florida Statutes require,
All persons who now or hereafter are employed by or who now
or hereafter are on the payroll of the state, or any of its
departments and agencies, subdivisions, counties, cities, school
boards and districts of the free public school system of the state
or counties, or institutions of higher learning, and all candidates
for public office, are required to take an oath before any person
duly authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments for
public record in the state...208
The statute continues by providing the following oath for each
covered person:

I, _

, a citizen of the State of Florida and of the United States
and a
of America, and being employed by or an officer of
recipient of public funds as such employee or officer, do hereby
solemnly swear or affirm that I will support20 9the Constitution of
the United States and of the State of Florida.

207. Id. 23(a).
208. FLA STAT. § 876.05 (2011).

209. Id.
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This oath, coupled with the statutory requirement placed on a
government employee, creates a major difference from those in the
private sector and requires a personal commitment to take appropriate
actions to comply with the Constitution when confronted with such
issues in the workplace.
Should a bureaucratic employee choose to ignore a potentially
injured party's constitutional assertion and fail to take action, a violation
of their sworn oath would occur. The employee specifically took on the
duty to support the Constitution in its entirety, not just a portion of it
that fails to include the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Lack of action
would constitute a blatant dereliction of duty. However, the educational
background of the bureaucratic employee may play a role in
determining the level of culpability. Some employees may not maintain
the requisite knowledge of the Constitution, but they should have the
proper training to seek appropriate advice in those instances from
supervisors and the Attorney General's office.
In contrast, the general counsel's office may not use such an excuse.
Its main function centers on providing critical legal advice and guidance
to the administrative agency and its employees. A decision by the
general counsel to ignore or redirect the question creates the same
violation of the sworn oath, but at a more troubling level. It is the
responsibility of an attorney to maintain knowledge of the U.S.
Constitution pursuant to their bar admission and by virtue of accepting
the office. It is within their job description and duties to protect and
defend against the occurrence of this type of abuse. The attorney could
also face sanctions or even disbarment for such contemptible behavior
that violates the ethical code of conduct for the profession.
Absent affirmative actions to bring the regulations into compliance
upon notice, a state bureaucratic employee and general counsel could
not only lose their positions, but face criminal prosecution and time in
jail for such a dereliction of duty with respect to a violation of the
Constitution.

III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the foregoing example, many other states likely have
similar regulatory language that excludes informational documents from
outside jurisdictions solely in favor of its own. The root cause of this
approach remains difficult to ascertain, but a number of hypotheses
present themselves on the matter. Poor legislative drafting is one reason
that may cause this issue in the first place. With all of the complexities
involved with drafting legislation, the wordsmith and reviewing counsel
may lose sight of issues such as individuals presenting documents from
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another state. The goal of accomplishing a certain objective may
overtake the limits and restrictions set forth by the Constitution. While
no excuse, this situation may occur more regularly than not due to the
continual pressures to eliminate waste and prove efficient performance
by the government.
In addition, the collective competence in a given subject of those
promulgating the legislation may play a role. The complexities in many
fields require special knowledge and expertise to complete the task. In
the example involving immunization records for school aged children,
the policy goal requires at least individuals with expertise in the areas of
health, education, and the law to give input. Obtaining qualified and
competent resources may prove difficult, but inadequacy of resources is
no excuse for poor legislation. If this is the case, the government should
not move forward with the law or regulation until properly funded or
staffed.
A final reason for this type of approach is based on the intent to
cause undue burdens upon citizens of other states founded on the belief
that most aggrieved parties will get frustrated by challenging the
government. While disingenuous and cynical, an improperly placed
government employee could take a maverick type of approach in the
misguided belief that the goal justifies the means. This should not occur
due to the numerous checks and balances, but the possibility still exists
no matter how remote.
Without considering the underlying cause, a simple solution to the
Florida example starts with revising the Florida Administrative Code
section 64D-3.046 to include in its language "or equivalent" 210 or by
adding a third subsection 64D-3.046(1)(a) that states "The equivalent
official record(s) from another state or territory governed under the laws
of the United States of America." 211 These two options will resolve the
issue on several levels. The first and most important aspect is that the
change will comply with the Constitution and the corresponding
legislation. This will ensure that children entering schools with official
executive documents from another state will not suffer a violation of
their constitutional rights. Moreover, it will ripple through the
210. The proposed regulation would be amended to read in 64D-3.046(1)(a)1: "DH Form
680, Florida Certification of Immunization (July 2010) or equivalent, incorporated by reference,
available from Department of Health (DOH) county health departments (CHDs) or physicians'
offices; or." Id. (emphasis added). This will still leave it to the courts to determine what
qualifies as equivalent but allows for the acceptance of out of state documents under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.
211. This would also require the following minor revision to 64D-3.046(1)(a)2 to now
read "DH Form 681, Religious Exemptions for Immunizations, incorporated by reference,
available at DOH CHDs, must be signed by the local county health department medical director
or designee; or." Id. (emphasis added).

THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLA USE

remaining regulations and statutes to provide immediate compliance
with the Constitution and the corresponding legislation, without
requiring further redrafting.
Additionally, these suggested revisions will avoid the need for
litigation and possible employee discipline. While each individual
instance of a state's refusal to honor an equivalent official document
may not rise to a level that makes a lawsuit practical, this changes when
there are many similarly situated plaintiffs that sustain injuries like that
of the countless number of children changing schools between states
each year. Making these changes will eliminate the financial liability
associated with the cumulative effect from such a noncompliant policy.
Meanwhile, it will also remove the opportunity for a government
employee to find themselves in situations where they can get
inadvertently caught in violating their sworn oath and eliminate the
need for the resulting criminal prosecution.
Despite the various ways in which an improper policy may originate,
the solutions to resolve this type of conflict with the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution and congressional. legislation appear
relatively straightforward by changing existing language to allow for the
acceptance of official executive documents from another state. This will
allow for any referencing laws or regulations to still maintain its
authority without additional revisions.
CONCLUSION

The latest expansion of the executive branch over the past halfcentury greatly increased the scope of regulatory actions upon the
public. With this phenomenon, it also increased the corresponding
number of moving parts to the governmental machine. As a result, this
relationship increases the likelihood that a state government will
inadvertently overstep its authority and violate the Constitution and
accompanying congressional legislation. Accordingly, states must be
willing to take immediate action to correct itself when discovered.
Considering the gravity of these types of violations, the state
governments need to routinely implement a self-examination process
for situations that blatantly void its laws, regulations, and policies. This
includes looking at the factual documents required from the public and
determining whether they can emanate from another state. The
Constitution, in conjunction with the congressional legislation, apply to
the official executive records with only factual content even though the
Supreme Court does not reveal a great deal about its position on the
subject.
Thus, the expansive coverage of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
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the Constitution in conjunction with the congressional legislation,
includes all three branches of the government and serves as a unifying
force across the states to disallow even minor infringements upon the
rights of the citizens of our country, whether through the interpretations
of the federal statutes or under our inherited general legal principles
from England's courts of record.

